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*University  of  New  Mexico The secular decline of bank business  lending and other traditional  banking  activities  raises 
serious  public  policy  concerns.  Most  observers  regard  banks as socially  indispensible  for their 
operation  of  the  payments  system  and  for  their  roles  in  transmitting  monetary  policy  and 
channelling  emergency  liquidity  to  the  financial  system.’  Some  fear  that  shrinkage  of  the 
banking  system  will  weaken  the  social  benefits  of  consumer  protection  and  community 
reinvestment  laws  that apply  to banks  but  not to their  nonbank  competitors.*  However,  unlike 
the  feared  decline  of  these  banking  functions,  the  social  cost  of  a decline  of  banks’  business 
i  For  example,  E.  Gerald  Corrigan,  “Rebuilding  the Financial  Strength  of  the  U.  S. 
Ranking  System,”  Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly  Review, Summer  1992,  l-4. 
*  Eugene  A.  Ludwig,  “The  Outlook  for  the Ranking  Industry,”  Bank News, January 
1994,  9-12.  Ludwig  adds:  “In another  generation,  at the current  rate  of  decline,  the  banking 
system  will  have  dwindled  to economic  insignificance”. 
1 lending  and  the  rise  of  nonbank  lenders  is  unclear. 3  Few who  fear  the  implications  of  the 
decline  in banks’  market  share  argue  that the decline  will  result  in the  inefficient  allocation of 
credit.  On the contrary,  the message implied in the shift of business borrowing to nonbank 
lenders may be that banks do IU)~  allocate credit efficiently. 
Nevertheless,  banks  have advantages as  allocators  of  credit  that  derive  from  their 
presumably  indispensible role  in  society.  Most  notably,  these include cost  advantages in 
gathering information about borrowers’ creditworthiness and in financing loans.  As operators 
of  the payments  system,  banks are in a unique position to assess the financial condition of 
borrowers by monitoring cash flows through the borrowers’ deposit accounts4  In addition, the 
deposit insurance system,  created because of congress’s desire to perpetuate critical banking 
functions, guarantees banks’ access to low cost funding and subsidizes their cost of capital.  On 
the other hand, some observers imply that the deposit insurance system leads to inefficient credit 
allocation by permitting an unhealthy expansion of banking.  Because it makes massive amounts 
of guaranteed funds available, deposit insurance may have supported the expansion of banking 
to the point that “excessive numbers of banks has meant destructive competition in lending to 
3  Becketti and Morris offer evidence that “nonbank sources of credit are becoming better 
substitutes for bank [business] loans”.  They conclude that the availability of alternative 
sources of credit has flattened the demand curve for bank loans. Sean Becketti and Charles 
Morris,  “Are Bank Loans Still Special?” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic 
Review, third quarter  1992,714X 
4  The specific advantage of privileged and costless information gamed by observing a 
borrowers’  deposit behavior over a period of time is raised by Fischer Black, “Bank Funds 
Management in an Efficient Market,” Joumul of huncial  Economics, 1975, 323-339 and 
Eugene F. Fama,  “What’s Different About Banks  ?” Journal of Monetary  Economics, June 
1985, 29-39. 
2 ever  less  creditworthy  customers.  “’ 
This  paper  reviews  the  shift  of  a large  segment  of  credit  market  share  to  commercial 
finance  companies  during  the past decade and raises the question  whether  banks’  loss  of market 
share  resulted  in a loss  of efficiency.  Primarily,  the paper  compares  the differences  in lending 
and risk intervention  strategies  between banks and commercial  finance companies  and generalizes 
about  the  results  in  terms  of  risk  reduction  and risk-return  tradeoffs.  Commercial  lending  by 
independent  finance  companies  and  commercial  finance  credit  subsidiaries  of  bank  holding 
companies  presents  an interesting  free market approximation  to compare  with lending  operations 
in a regulated  bank  environment.6 
The  first  section  reviews  the relative  decline  in bank  lending  and  the concomitant  rise 
of  commercial  finance  company  lending.  The  next  section  characterizes  differences  in  loan 
selection  by banks  and finance  companies,  describes credit  intermediaries  as risk intervenors  and 
compares  how  banks  and  finance  companies  exercise  three  distinct  stages  of risk  intervention. 
The  section  following  this  presents  evidence  on the effectiveness  of  risk  intervention  by banks 
and finance  companies.  The  next  section  applies  the market  model  from  the finance  literature 
to attempt  a comparison  of  post  intervention  risk  in banks  and  finance  companies.  The  next 
section  attempts  to  explain  differences  in  the  effectiveness  of  risk  intervention  by  banks  and 
5  Robert  R.  Glauber,  “FDICIA:  The  Wheels  Came  Off  on the  Road  Through  Congress”, 
in Assessing Bank Reform: FDICU  One Year Later, ed.  George  G.  Kaufman  and  Robert  E. 
Litan  (Washington,  D.  C.:  Brookings  Institution,  1993, 33-41. 
6  To  be  sure,  finance  companies  are  not totally  unregulated.  For  example,  they  must 
adhere  to an  unfavorable  system  of providing  for loan  losses  that prevents  treating  loss 
provisions  as a routine  tax deductible  business  expense.  Small  banks  are  permitted  such 
expense. 
3 finance  companies  by contrasting  generic  qualities  of their  credit  cultures,  including  the effects 
of  bank  supervision.  The  final  section  summarizes  policy  implications. 
Banks’  Share  of C&I Loans 
Decline in  Bank  Business Lending 
Data readily  confirm  the extent  of a decade-long  loss of banks’  market  share  in business 
lending  to commercial  finance  companies.  Table  1 shows  that  in every  year  during the period 
from  1983 through  1992,  business  credit  at commercial  finance  companies  grew  faster  than  at 
U.  S. commercial  banks.  The  ratio  of  finance company  business  credit  to bank  commercial  and 
industrial  (C&J) loans  swelled  from  20 percent  in  1982 to 55 percent  in  1992. 
Numerous  explanations  of this dramatic  shift have been offered.  A long-term  view holds 
that  the  reduction  in bank  loans  to business  is a continuation  of losses  of business  relationships 
that  began  with  the  late  1960s’  episodes  of  Regulation  Q-induced  disintermediation.  Major 
banks  of  that  era  periodically  encounter&  shortages  of  funds  and  reneged  on  lending 
commitments  to large  corporate  borrowers,  forcing  the corporations  to find  alternative  sources 
of credit  such as the commercial  paper  market. ’  Another  view holds  that banks  have  lost  their 
historical  funding  cost  advantage  compared  to nondepository  intermediaries.  Deposit  interest 
rate deregulation  of the 198Os, recent  increases  in FDIC insurance  premiums  and a stiffer  pricing 
environment  brought  on  by  competition  for  deposits  from  investment  intermediaries  such  as 
’  James  L.  Pirece,  77~ Future of Banking, Yale University  Press  (1991),  6. 
4 mutual  funds  directly  impacted  banks’  cost  of  funds.’ 
Further,  the  loss  of  banks’  traditional  “blue  chip”  corporate  loan  market,  profitability 
concerns  and  the  opportunity  to exploit  FDIC  protection  of  their  uninsured  deposits  attracted 
banks  to  the  promise  of  large  payoffs  on  high  risk  loans  to  less  developed  countries,  energy 
development  and production,  real  estate  and  highly  leveraged  takeovers.’  In  this  pursuit  they 
shrank  lending  to their  bread-and-butter  core  customers  in the small and  middle  markets.  The 
turning  away  from  core  business  borrowers  may  have  been  accentuated  by  banks’  excessive 
caution  during  the  early  1990s  economic  downturn  when  they  dramatically  tightened  credit 
standards  and  reduced  nonconsumer  lending.”  In  the  meantime,  finance  companies  persisted 
in  their  traditional  core  asset-based  loan  markets. 
Finally,  overzealous  regulation  and  tough 
cyclical  declines  in the availability  of bank credit. 
bank  examinations  may  be  responsible  for 
In late  199 1, in  response  to this perception, 
high  level  Bush  administration  officials  lectured  bank  examiners  about  the  need  for  “character 
lending”  and  the banking  agencies  modified  supervisory  rules  on real  estate  lending. I1 During 
1993,  in  a  similar  vein, 
introducing  streamlined 
the  Clinton  administration  modified  bank  supervisory  procedures  by 
measures  for  loan  applications,  including  reduced  documentation 
g  Cynthia  A.  Glassman,  The Weakening  Role of Bath  in Financing Small Business, 
Association  of  Reserve  City  Bankers,  1993. 
9  Supra note  7. 
lo  Mike  McNamee,  “Jumping  into  the Credit  Gaps,”  Business Week, October  19,  1992, 
94,95. 
I1  Office  of  the  Comptroller  of the Currency,  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation, 
Federal  Reserve  Board  and  Office  of Thrift  Supervision,  “Interagency  Policy  Statement  on 
the  Review  and  Classification  of  Commercial  Real  Estate  Loans”,  November  7,  1991. 
5 requirements  .  Also,  in  particular,  some observers believe that  the  Basle capital adequacy 
guidelines and, recently, the prompt regulatory action capital provisions contained in Section 13  1 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of  1991, have shifted banks’ 
priorities  from  acquiring  new loans to building their capital positions.‘*  Alternatively,  the 
influence of  capital requirements on bank lending may be positive  when the relationship is 
examined over several lending cycle~.~~ 
On the other hand, the decline in C&I lending at banks may be only a temporary matter. 
Banking firms have shifted “down market” into middle and smalI firm markets served by finance 
companies and otherwise  have invaded finance company markets by establishing asset-based 
lending  umts  or  subsidiaries,  with  the  latter  frequently  accomplished  by  acquiring  well- 
established finance companies.  *’ Given their superior capital strength, including implied public 
capital derived from government deposit insurance, this substitution of bank lending for finance 
company lending is predictable.  With such a shift, the issue raised in this paper concerning the 
“goodness” of bank lending is joined. 
l2  A view representative of the early  1990s appears  in Simon Brady,  Credit Crunch? 
What Credit Crunch,” Euromoney, March 1991, 22-32. 
l3 Robert R. Moore,  “Bank Lending and Rank Capital: A Panel Data Assessment of 
Market and P. ounting  Values,” Finance Industry  Studies Working  Paper, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas,  2-94 March  1994. 
l4  See Leslie  Scism,  “Commercial  Finance  Firms  Have New  Rivals  in  Banks,”  Wall 
Street Journal, June 24,  1993. 
6 Financial  Finns  as Risk  Interveners 
Risk  Profiles:  Banks  and  Finance  Companies 
Commercial  finance  companies,  particularly  the independent  firms,  typically  are thought 
of  as  high  risk  institutions.  On  an  asset  quality  scale,  conventional  wisdom  places  them 
somewhere  between  pawn  shops  and  “quick-cash”  storefronts  on the low  end  and  commercial 
banks  on  the  high  end.  Their  clients  are  considered  less  creditworthy  than  commercial  bank 
borrowers.  A typical finance  company  mission is to provide  asset-based  financing  to ‘companies 
which  are  unable  to  obtain  financing  from  traditional  sources.“‘5  Some  firms  target  “ugly” 
industries  typically  shunned  by  banks  such as auto  repair  shops,  doughnut  shops,  and  gospel 
radio  stations.r6  In general,  commercial  finance  companies  lend  to borrowers  that  are  highly 
leveraged,  are  prone  to grow  rapidly, 
of  past  success  and  are  thought  to  be 
variance  operating  cash  flows. 
serve  relatively  unstable  markets,  lack  a lengthy  record 
less  well  managed.  In  general,  they  tend  to  have  high 
Conventional  wisdom  about  the  asset  quality  of  commercial  banks  is  dramatically 
different.  High  risk  activities  are  proscribed  by  bank  regulation  while  on-site  inspections  by 
bank  regulators  attempt to reinforce  safety and soundness  of banks.”  By tradition,  the business 
lending  divisions  of banks  select loans  with low default  probabilities  as determined  by  “periodic 
evaluations  of  the  organization’s  ability  to  met  low-priority  (subordinated]  fixed  payoff 
”  SNL  Securities,  L.P.,  The SNL Finuncial Services Quarterly, 1993,  1, Number  4,  B- 
40. 
”  BBB Research,  1992.  “Allied  Capital  Overview”. 
l7  Supra note 7. contracts”. I*  Such evaluations determine the sufficiency of and acceptable expected variance 
of borrowers’ cash flows.  Researchers have provided empirical evidence of the value of banks’ 
evaluation processes by showing that the market values of borrowing firms rise either when they 
initiate bank loan agreements19  (but not private placements) or else when loan agreements are 
renewedM 
Federally-guaranteed sources of funds combined with prophylactic regulation may insulate 
banks from  the discipline of market forces.  These factors might nourish a cloistered credit 
culture that prevents banks from efficiently performing the tasks of, fist,  measuring borrower 
risk and then pricing, structuring and managing credits to produce an appropriate return on (and 
recovery  of) their investment. 
In the first instance, insured depositors provide funds without concern for the quality of 
banks’ credit management and may make banks indiscreet about credit risk.  Second, because 
they are regulated, banks may have developed a credit culture that is not suited to dealing with 
market forces efficiently because bankers are preoccupied with creative responses to “man-made” 
regulation and on-site examinations.  As a result of government’s role, banks may be inhibited 
in the development of innovative approaches to pricing, structuring and managing credit and may 
fail to adopt a sufficiently independent strategic focus. 
I8  Fama, supru note 4. 
r9 Christopher James, “Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans: A Comparison 
of Broad Borrowing Agreements, Private Placements and Public Debt Offerings,” Joumul of 
Financial Ecorwmics 19, 217-236. 
*O Scott Lummer and John McConnell,“Further Evidence on the Rank Lending Process 
and the Capital Market Response to Rank Loan Guarantees,” (Purdue University,  West 
lafayette,  JN), 1988. 
8 Risk  Intervention 
I  postulate  a  simple  theory  of  risk  intervention  as  a  vehicle  for  evaluating  credit 
management  in  banks  and  commercial  finance  companies.  Credit  intermediaries  acquire  the 
exogenous  risks  of  many  single  borrowers  with  given  levels  and  variances  of  cash  outflows. 
They  tap  into  borrowers’  cash  flows  and  aggregate  and  transform  them  to  create  their  own 
institutional  cash  flow  pattern  for ultimate  distribution  to their  investors.*’  The aggregation  and 
transformation  of borrowers’  cash flows  is not a transparent  process.  Managers  of all  financial 
institutions,  including  mutual  funds,  pension  funds,  finance  companies,  banks  and  others, 
intervene  to control  the  detrimental  effects  of the variances  of  their  borrowers’  cash  flows  on 
their  institutions  and the institutions’  shareholders.  I analyze  this  intervention  in three  stages as 
illustrated  in  Figure  1. 
In  the first  stage of risk  intervention.  financial  institutions  diversify  the accumulation  of 
single assets  in order  to avoid asset portfolios  of homogeneous  borrowers  with highly  correlated 
exogenous  risks.  In  addition,  at  this  stage,  they  control  the  match  of  asset  maturities  with 
funding  maturities. 
In  the  second  stage,  finance  companies  and banks  do not  simply  broker  the diversified 
exogenous  (stage one)  risk of their  borrowers  through  to their  shareholders  as mutual  funds do. 
Instead,  in a process  of risk  endogenization,  they  attempt  to overcome  asymmetric  information 
*’  ESank  investors  include  private  capitalists  and taxpayers.  The  latter  and  their  agent, 
the Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation,  also  are exposed  to  the variance  of banks’  cash 
flows  as  standby  investors. 
9 How  CREDIT  INTERMEDIARIES 
MANAGE  RIK 
RISK 
ENTION 
’  stage 1 
.  Stage 3 and  design  contracts  that  transform  borrower  risk. n  Risk  endogenization  is  accomplished 
through  systems  of  gathering  borrower  information,  contracting,  auditing,  monitoring 
performance  and creating  sets of external  and  internal  ~rices.~  24 
The  third  stage  of  risk  intervention  for  the  control  of  investor  risk  consists  of  capital 
allocation.  Managers  allocate  capital  against  the expected  variances  of  cash  flows  from  their 
several  asset  portfolios. 25 The  larger  institutions’  capital  allocations  the  smaller  the  remaining 
mean  and  variance  of cash  flows  realized  by  individual  shareholders,  either  as dividends  or  as 
gains  from  reinvested  earnings.  The  probabilities  of  being  wiped  out  are  large  for  thinly 
capitalized  institutions  with  high  variances  of  internal  cash  flows.  In  the  special  case  of 
z  There  is a rich  theoretical  literature  explaining  how  financial  intermediaries  overcome 
informational  frictions.  A sampling  includes  Y.  Chan,  “On the Positive  Role  of  Financial 
Intermediation  in Allocation  of  Venture  Capital  in a Market  with  Imperfect  Information,” 
Journal  of Finance 38,  1543-1568;  Douglas  W.  Diamond,  “Financial  Intermediation  and 
Delegated  Moni&ng  , ” Review  of Economic Studies 5 1, 393-414;  Ramakrishnan  and 
Thakor, 
23 This  view  is inspired  by Mark  Flannery’s  distinction  between  exogenous  risk  and  the 
endogenization  of risk  which  consists  of  reducing  information  asymmetries,  selecting  loans 
and  transforming  the attributes  of  “opaque”  claims  on borrowers.  The  present  approach 
isolates  asset  selection  as stage one and  reserves  the  term  “risk  endogenization”  for 
intermediaries  that  use the  systems  described  to transform  the qualities  of  assets.  See 
especially  pp.  236-238  of  Mark  J.  Flannery,  “Capital  Regulation  and  Insured  Banks’  Choice 
of  Individual  Loan  Default  Risks,”  Joumal  of Monetary  Economics, 1989,  24,  235-258. 
u  An  interesting  review  of the application  of  internal  prices  to accounting  and auditing 
under  conditions  of costly  contracting  is presented  in Ray Bali,  “The  Firm  as a Specialist 
Contracting  Intermediary:  Application  to Accounting  and  Auditing,”  working  paper, 
University  of  Rochester,  May  1989. 
zs  Banks  apply  practical  schemes  for  allocating  capital  to cover  both  expected  and 
unexpected  losses  in  their  product  or  business  lines.  Standard  loss  reserve  accounting 
provides  for  expected  losses.  Conceptually,  unexpected  losses  are covered  by allocating  an 
amount  of  capital  to cover,  for  example,  a  “two- or  three-sigma”  event  from  a subjective 
probability  distribution  of  losses  estimated  for  unanticipated  negative  events.  Donald  G. 
Simonson,  “Putting  Capital  Where  It’s  Needed”,  United  States  Banker, May  1993, 68,71. 
11 federally-insured depositories,  regulatory formulae set minimum capital levels at the portfolio 
as well as aggregate levels and taxpayers provide standby capital in the form of guaranteed 
funding at below market cost. 
Also in the special case of banks and other federally-insured depositories, regulators and 
on-site  supervisors  serve  as  taxpayers’  agents and constitute  an  additional,  external,  risk 
intervenor.  The  essence  of  their  role  is  to  police  the  three  stages  of  institutional  risk 
intervention. 
Stage One:  Divelsifkation  and  Matching. 
For  all appearances, banks take smaller risks than commercial finance companies in 
managing the diversification and matching stage of institutional risk intervention.  Most banks’ 
loan policies  specify a target loan mix that distributes default exposure among a variety  of 
consumer, business and government clients with widely varied needs.  Moreover,  banks are 
subject to  formal  diversification  regulations  that prevent  concentrations of  loans  to  single 
borrowers  and restrict  loans to insiders and nonbank affiliates.%  On the other hand, banks 
serving small and medium-sized businesses may have larger geographic concentrations than 
many finance companies have.  n  Also pertinent to stage one risk intervention, interest rate risk 
regulations tend to force banks to pay closer attention to the matching of asset cash flows with 
26 Loan concentrations are addressed most rezntly  in the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.  Section 305 requires the federal agencies to revise 
bank risk-based capital standards “to take adequate account of concentration of credit risk”. 
n  Small and medium-size businesses that use bank financing almost always use a local 
bank.  In contrast, geographic proximity is not nearly as important in these firms’ use of 
finance companies.  “Banking Markets and the Use of Financial Services by Small and 
Medium-Sized Businesses,” Gregory E. Elliehausen and John D. Wolken, Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, October 1990, 801-817. 
12 liability  cash  flows. 
The  receivables  of independent  commercial  finance  companies  generally  are  considered 
more concentrated  than banks because  they tend to specialize  in certain  types of financial  “niche” 
markets  and products.  Typically  they  serve one or just  a few industries  and focus  on one or just 
a few of a spectrum  of business  lines  such as accounts  receivable  and inventory-based  revolving 
debt,  machinery  and equipment  loans,  factoring,  floor planning,  leasing,  leveraged  buyouts  and 
other  financings  usually  associated  with  the  industry  as  a  whole.2*  For  example,  individual 
finance  companies  might concentrate  their efforts  in niche markets  such as leasing  a specific  line 
of equipment  or  financing  receivables  in a certain  industry  segment.  Many  small  independent 
firms  conduct  only  one  line  of  business.29 
Stage  Two:  Risk Endogenization. 
HistoricaIly  banks  were  considered  to  have  an  inherent  advantage  in  endogenizing 
borrower  risk  because  of  their  confidential  relationships  with  large  groups  of  customers  about 
whom  public  information  was  limited. 3o  With  advances  in  computers  and  communications, 
information  costs  have  fallen  sharply  over  the  past  twenty  or  so  years  and  largely  have 
28 The  Commercial  Finance  Association  lists  the types of  financing  offered  by  each  of  its 
members  in  “Addendum  to Membership  Roster  Types,  Size & Marketing  Area  of  Loans,” 
revised  5119193. 
2g For  example,  the entire  business  of one  firm  I interviewed  consisted  of  factoring 
medical  insurance  receivables  originated  in small  clinics. 
M  See Cynthia  A.  Glassman,  l?~  Weakening  Role of Banks in Financing Small Business, 
Association  of  Reserve  City  Rankers,  June  1993, especially  34 and 35.  Also  supra note  4. 
13 eliminated banks’ information advantages.  ”  It is difficult to find other institutional barriers that 
prevent nonbanks such as commercial finance companies from competing equally with banks in 
processing borrower risks and tailoring the attributes of claims on borrowers to their liking, 
On the other hand, because they are regulated, banks may be at a disadvantage compared 
to unregulated finance company competitors.  Bankers’ assessments of risk and their systems for 
processing  risk  are  accountable to the  opinions of  regulators  who,  in  turn,  have  multiple 
incentives that may or may not be responsive to market forces3* Finance company lenders are 
free to act principally in the interest of themselves and their shareholders.  Further,  the same 
moral  hazards  associated with deposit  insurance  that  are  purported  to  increase  bankers’ 
preferences  for risk may also make them inattentive to endogenizing risk.33 
Finally,  the greater loan selection risks of !?nance companies might be seen as a virtue 
if the risks are fully priced and are offset by  superior systems of risk endogenization.  The 
3* While not directly related to risk intervention, banks may enjoy a funding advantage 
in making loans because deposit insurance provides them with funds at below market cost. 
Lower cost funds may give banks a greater margin for erroneously underpricing risk: not a 
good habit in itself, but one that might make banks unwittingly more competitive. 
n  In his extensive critique of the deposit insurance system, Ed Kane explains how the 
system perversely incentivizes regulators.  For example, Edward J. Kane, Confronting 
Incentive Problems in U. S. Deposit Insurance,” Deregulation of Financial Services, public 
Policy in FZu,  edited by George Kaufman and Roger C. Kormendi, Ballinger Publishing 
Co.,  Camnbridge, Mass.,  1986;  Kane, “How Incentive-Incompatible Deposit Insumace 
Funds Fail,”  Pro&now Educational Foundation, Research Report 88-014, Madison, 
Wisconsin; Kane, “Changing Incentives Facing Financial Services Regulators,” Conference 
on Perspectives on Banking Regulation, Federal Reserve Rank of Cleveland, Ohio, 1988. 
33 There are many sources that explain the moral hazard of the unlimited taxpayer 
guarantee of deposits.  The history of its role in the thrift debacle is in James R. Barth and 
Philip F. Bartholomew, “The Thrift Industry Crisis:  Revealed Weaknesses in the Federal 
Deposit Insurance System, ” in Z?ae  Reform of Federal Deposit Insurance, James R. Barth and 
R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr.,  editors, Harper Business,  1992. 
14 typical  finance  company  attitude  is  that  “with  a niche  lending  approach  [finance  companies’] 
expertise  can take higher  credit  risks,  charge  more for it and more than offset  the banks’  cheaper 
cost  of  funds  and  lower  infrastructure  costs.“”  In  general,  finance  companies  are  perceived 
as  experts  in  the  control  of  and,  if  necessary,  liquidation  of  collateral  in  narrow  lines  of 
business.” 
Stage  Three:  Capital Allocation. 
Before  deposit  insurance,  near-insolvent  banks were suspended  quickly  and closed if they 
were  unable  to  recapitalize  themselves:  as  a  result,  depositor  losses  were  miniscule.” 
Following  the  passage  of deposit  insurance,  the discipline  of banks’  depositors  weakened  and, 
over  time,  their  capital  ratios  steadily  declined.  Although  safety-net  initiatives  like  deposit 
insurance  are  intended  to  insure  banking  stability,  they  actually  encourage  risk-taking  and 
suboptimal  bank  capital,  as  the  recent  banking  dilemma  has  shown  because  standby  taxpayer 
capital  is  substituted  for  private  shareholder  capital.  The  perverse  incentives  of  deposit 
insurance  are  controllable  with  increasingly  explicit  regulation  of  capital  such  as  the  prompt 
regulatory  action  provisions  of  the FDIC  Improvement  Act of  1991. 
Still,  before  the  recent  rash  of  thrift  and  bank  failures  depository  institutions  were 
considered  by  the  markets  to  be  low  risk.  A  number  of  academicians  believe  that  capital 
w  Quotation  of  Michael  J.  Litwin,  Heller  Financial,  Inc.  in Sidney  Rutberg,  “Factoring 
and  Commercial  Finance  in  the  Year 2000,”  The Secured Lender, January/February  1993, 
26,  28,  30,  31. 
”  Eli  M.  Remolona  and Kurt  C.  Wulfekuhler,  “Finance  Companies,  Rank  Competition, 
and Niche  Markets,”  Federal  Reserve  Rank of  New  York  QuurterZy  Review, Summer  1992, 
25-38. 
M  See George  G.  Kaufman,  “Rank Risk  in Historical  Perspective”  in George  G. 
Kaufman,  ed.,  Research in Financial Services, Greenwich,  Connecticut:  JAI  Press,  1989. 
15 regulation  itself  contains  perverse  incentives  and  may  induce  greater  risk-taking  or  at  least 
suboptimal  choices  of  assets  by  banks. 37  This  paper  adopts  the  more  traditional  view  that 
higher  levels  of  risk-taking  must  be  supported  by  higher  levels  of  capital.  As  noted,  in  the 
absence  of  stricter  capital  regulation,  increased  risk  is supported  by  taxpayers. 
For  their  part,  unregulated  (independent)  finance  companies  depend  on  the discipline  of 
markets  for  the acceptance  of  their  securities  issuances.  Remolona  and  Wulfekuhler  conclude 
that  credit  ratings  govern  the  growth  of  finance  companies  by  conditioning  their  access  to 
funds  ‘*  Fast-growing  companies  have  stronger  credit  ratings  than  slow-growing  companies.  . 
Effectively,  the ratings  agencies  set the capital  requirements  for  finance  companies. 
Comparative  Risk  Intervention:  The  Evidence 
In this  section  I compare  the effectiveness  of risk  intervention  by banks  and commercial 
finance  companies.  Such comparisons  might reveal  disadvantages  of banks  that can be remedied 
by bankers  and regulators.  Alternatively,  they  might  reveal inherent  weaknesses  that cast doubt 
on the alhxational  efficiency  of the substitution  of bank loans  for finance  company  loans.  Data 
limitations  on  finance  companies  may  affect  the  validity  of comparisons  of  the  endogenization 
of  borrower  risk  by  banks  and  tice  companies.  Data  on  capital  allocation  by  banks  and 
37 A sampling  of  this  literature  includes  Gerard  Gennotte  and David  Pyle,  “Capital 
Controls  and  Risk,”  Joumul  of Bunking and  Finance,  1991,  15, 805-824;  Daesik  Kim  and 
Anthony  M.  Santomero,  “Risk  in Ranking  and  Capital  Regulation,”  Joumul  of.  3nunce, 
Decemeber  1988, 43,  1219-1233;  Y.  Kahane,  “Capital  Adequacy  and  ‘he Regulation  of 
Financial  Intermediaries,  ”  Journal  of Banking and Finance,  1977,  1,  ‘-218. 
3a Supra  note  35. 
16 finance companies  are  more  available,  although  the  finance  company  data again  are  limited  in 
=-5= 
The  most satisfactory  data on a representative  breadth  of commercial  finance  companies 
are  produced  from  annual  surveys  conducted  by the  First  National  Rank of  Chicago  (FNRC). 
The  data  are  not directly  comparable  to the FDIC  data reported  on commercial  banks  but  some 
of  them  appear  to  be  meaningful  for  the  purposes  of  this  study.39  FNRC  reports  data  for 
“diversified”  finance  companies  as welI as for  consumer  finance  companies.  I use the data  on 
diversified  companies,  defined  as  companies  that  hold  more  than  25  percent  of  their  loan 
receivables  in  business  credit,  which  are  based  on  a  composite  of  representative  firms  that 
operate  on a national  and regional  scale, as well as locally.  The fiance  company  ratios  reported 
in Tables  2 and 3 are simple  arithmetic  averages  of the ratios  for the surveyed  companies: small 
local companies carry the same weight as very large national companies.  The ratios reported 
for commercial banks are derived from aggregate FDIC  data  for  alI insured  U.  S.  banks. 
Risk  Endogenization. 
Table 2 presents several ratios pertaining to the  internal risk processing of banks and 
tinance companies.  Loan loss data (charge-offs minus  recoveries)  is shown in columns 1 and 
2.  These data are available for diversified finance companies only for the six years of 1987- 
1992. The FNBC diversified companies’ annual charge-offs to loans during 1987-1992  averaged 
39 First National began reporting !Ynancial  ratios on installment sales finance companies 
in 1935.  The bank has extended credit lines to finance companies since 1916.  John R. 
Swift, Ratios of the Installment  Sales Finance and Consumer Finance Companies, First 
National Rank of Chicago (revised September 1982); Raymond M. Neihengen, Analysis  of 
Finance  Cornpuny  Ratios  in 1987,  First National Rank of Chicago, 1988; Mark C. Kramer 
and Raymond N. Neihengen, “Analysis of Finance Company  Ratios  in  1992,” Journal of 
Commercial Lending, September 1993, 37-46. 
17 138 basis points.  Charge-off rates on loans and leases for banks during this period averaged 125 
basis points and were considerably larger than their 70 basis points average for the period 1981- 
1986 but moderately less than the 138 basis points finance company average.  The shift in net 
charge-offs by banks occurred in 1987 and began a period of loss reckoning for banks, following 
a series of forays in the early and middle 1980s into nontraditional lines of credit such as highly 
leveraged transactions and commercial real estate. 
Assuming  equal  risk  processing proficiency  among  banks  and  commercial  finance 
companies, the latters’ reputed  selection  of  lower  quality loans and less  diversified  portfolios 
suggests,  u priori,  significantly larger losses for finance companies.  The differential average 
loss rate  of  13 basis points for the  1987-1992 time period does not appear to be especially 
significant.  Further,  charge-off ratios for banks for the period were less predictable with a 
standard deviation of 0.26 compared with 0.19 for finance companies. 
Columns 3 and 4 reveal how well the two types of firms anticipated charge-offs and 
whether they set aside an actuarially sound reserve for absorbing charge-offs.  For simplicity, 
I assume that loan loss allowances (the reserve account on the balance sheet) are set at the end 
of each year in anticipation of the next year’s losses and, therefore,  I divide the allowance by 
the net charge-offs of the following year.  This ratio reveals that banks’ coverage of ensuing 
charge-offs exceeded that of finance companies in every year and averaged 2.04 compared with 
an average of  1.58 for finance companies.  However, the finance company coverage appeared 
to be adequate at  a level well above one throughout the period  which suggests that banks’ 
coverage was excessive at times.  In addition, bank loss coverage during 19861991  was more 
variable with a standard deviation of 0.39 compared to 0.24 for finance companies.  Finally, the 
18 banks’  coverage  takes an extreme jump  to 3.25 based on  1992 allowances,  indicating  especially 
poor  anticipation  of  the  decline  in  bank  charge-offs  in  1993.  One  interpretation  of  the 
differences  observed  in loan loss reserving  is that examiners  unduly  sought protective  cover  for 
themselves  against  the possibility  of  bank  failures. 
This  interpretation  contradicts  a somewhat  related  analysis  by Bemanke  and  Lown  who 
reject  a widespread  assertion  that examiners  were excessively  strict in forcing  commercial  banks 
to take  charges-offs  and  were,  therefore,  a factor  in causing  the  MO-1992  “credit  crunch”.40 
Bemanke  and  Lown  apply  the ratio  of provisions  for  loan  losses  (an expense  or  flow  account) 
divided  by  net  charge-offs  to  assess  the  “actuarial  fairness”  of  such,  presumably  examiner- 
induced,  provisions.  The  present  analysis  adds  insight  into  this  issue.  Considering  the 
conventional  wisdom  that finance  companies  select lower quality  assets and portfolios  of assets, 
the  finding  of  routinely  larger  bank  allowance  coverage  could  be  interpreted  as  excessive 
influence  by  examiners  on bank  reserves. 
Columns  5  and  6  of  Table  2  presents  a  longer  time  series  for  banks  and  finance 
companies  relating  allowances  for  loan  losses to troubled  (noncurrent)  loans  during  1981-1993. 
In  general,  future  loan  charge-offs  are drawn  from  the pool  of  noncurrent  loans,  the  majority 
of  which,  however,  ultimately  are  collected.  The  table  shows  that  banks’  and  finance 
companies’  average  ratios  for the common  period  of  1982-1991,  at 0.68  and 0.65  respectively, 
are essentially  identical.  The larger  standard deviation  of the bank ratios  of 0.22  actually  reflect 
a trend  in which banks progressively  raised their reserves  in response  to an awakening  of greater 
M  Ben S.  Bemanke  and  Cara  S.  Lown,  “The Credit  Crunch,”  Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity,  2: 1991,  205-248. 
19 risk associated with noncurrent assets.  The finance company ratios, with a standard deviation 
of 0.10,  indicate that these firms made a highly stable assessment 
Capital  Allocation. 
of noncurrent loans. 
Table 3 compares the aggregate capital ratios of banks with their unregulated diversified 
finance company competitors.  Capital is defined to include equity and subordinated term debt. 
Finance company capital ratios were considerably larger than those for banks and differed by 
amounts ranging from nearly  15 percent in the early  1980s to over 6 percent in 1992.  The 
above comparison of recent loss qmiences  and expectations of losses from troubled assets 
revealed  in loss accounting data suggest that the two types of firms similarly  diversify  and 
endogenize risk.  In essence, it is unlikely that the variances of their institutional cash flows can 
be easily differentiated.  In other words, based on this paper’s findings, the combined differences 
in the two types of institutions’ portfolio and endogenous risks are not nearly large enough to 
explain such differences in capital support. 
On this evidence, if banks were unregulated and subject to complete market discipline, 
presumably the market might require them to maintain an aggregate capital ratio approximately 
equal to that of finance companies. The observed contemporary difference between their ratios 
of  6  percent,  then,  is  attributable to  implicit  standby  capital  provided  by  taxpayers.  A 
contemporary estimate of the value of FDIC reserves and taxpayer standby capital is roughly 
$220 billion, based on bank assets of nearly $3.7 trillion. 
It  is  likely  that the comparative portfolio and endogenous risks of  the two types  of 
institutions have converged since the middle 198os, and have tended to equalize intrinsic capital 
requirements.  I cannot supply evidence of this convergence by comparing data on net charge- 
20 offs  because  the  data  were  not  available  for  finance  companies  for  the  earlier  period. 
Undoubtedly,  however,  banks  were  considered  eminently  safer  than  finance  companies  in  the 
early  1980s  before  they  were  beset  by  a  sequence  of  catastrophic  defaults  on  LDC,  energy, 
commercial  real  estate  and  LB0  loans,  followed  by  previously  unimagined  numbers  of  bank 
failures.  While  many  banks  digressed  from  their  bread-and-butter  markets  in  conventional 
middle  market  business  credit,  finance  companies  doubled their  aggregate  business  lending  from 
1985 to  1991.“’ 
Finally,  the  return  on  equity  ratios  (ROES) reported  in  Table  3  provide  interesting 
comparisons  of risk  and reward  to suppliers  of equity capital  for commercial  banks  and finance 
companies.  Over  the  respective  periods  for  which the data  are  reported,  the  average  ROE  for 
banks  was  10.34 percent  and  12.96 percent  for finance companies,  a 262 basis-point  advantage 
for  the  latter.  Counter  to  intuition,  however,  the  effective  risk  of  variable  returns  to 
shareholders  was fifty  percent greater  for banks,  with a standard  deviation  of ROE equal to 3.56 
(34 percent  of  the  mean),  compared  to 2.74  (2 1 percent  of the  mean)  for  finance  companies. 
Equity  Risk and  Return 
The  final  arbiter  of  credit  intermediaries’  risk  intervention  policies  is  the  sensitivity  of 
41 Citing  this  trend,  Remolona  and Wulfekuhler  note:  “finance  companies  set  themselves 
apart  from  commercial  banks  by  sustaining  impressive  growth  in business  credit  through  the 
second  half  of  the decade..  . [banks’]  commercial  and industrial  loans  grew  barely  2.8  percent 
a year...  while  finance  company  receivables  altogether  rose  nearly  10.4 percent  a year  from 
1985 to  1990...  A major  growth  area  in business  credit  for  finance  companies  came  in 
leasing.  Supra note  35;  26,27. 
21 their shareholders’ risk to overall risk in the stock market.  Because the stock market is sensitive 
to economic risks associated with industrial activity, interest rates, inflation, business failures 
and so forth,  it is important to test whether the effect of intermediaries’ asset  selection and 
diversification,  risk  endogenization,  and capital  allocation is  to  increase  or  decrease  their 
sensitivity to such risks. 
The market model relies on “beta” as a measure of the sensitivity of an individual firm’s 
or a class of firms’ equity returns to the return on the equity market at large.  Beta represents 
sensitivity to non-diversifiable risk: stocks with large betas should produce large returns relative 
to overall stock market returns. 
Using ordinary least 4uares,  beta was estimated for stock price indices for banks and 
finance companies by regressing each index on the Standard & Poors 500 Stock Index.  I used 
monthly returns calculated from daily quotations for the SNL Finance Company Index of Stock 
Prices, the SNL Commercial Bank Index of Stock Prices and the Standard & Poors 500 Stock 
Index from January 1989 to October 1993.42 Unfortunately, the SNL Finance Company Jndex 
is not specific to commercial finance firms but covers a wide spectrum of publicly-traded firms, 
including those  specializing in consumer,  credit  card,  acceptance and  commercial  finance. 
Prices for this index were not collected before January  1989. 
The general form for the market model is: 
qt  =  aI  +  4rsrcp.t  +  et 
42 Data were provided courtesy of SNL Securities, Charlottesville, Virginia. 
22 where rrst  is the percentage return for the bank or finance company stock index over period t in 
excess of the risk-free (91day  treasury bill) rate of return, rsap is the percentage return on the 
S&P 500, a is the excess return, b is the sensitivity of the index in question to the S&P 500 and 
e is the residual risk.  The return measures exclude dividends.  Table 4 presents the monthly 
percentage returns  and standard deviations of returns on 91day  treasury  bills and the three 
indices as well as the parameters of the market model regressions. 
The  mean monthly finance company returns  of  1.81 percent were well in excess of 
monthly returns of 0.71 percent on banks and 0.82 percent on the S&P 500 stocks.  On the other 
hand, the standard deviations of 5.86 percent for banks and 6.15 percent for finance companies 
indicate that risk for each industry during the period was essentially the same.  This similarity 
appears  to corroborate  my  earlier  conclusion, derived  from analysis  of aggregate  financial 
statement data for banks and commercial iinance companies, that ex post risk was essentially the 
same for both types of institutions.  The standard deviation of market returns is a measure of 
total risk, however, while risk to diversified investors is estimated by the market model. 
The R-squared values of the market model regressions indicate that 59 percent and 56 
percent, respectively,  of the variability in returns on the bank and finance company indices is 
explained by  variability  in the S&P 500.  The finance company beta of  1.26 is just  slightly 
larger  than the bank beta of  1.23.  Both are highly significant statistically and the difference 
between them is well within one standard deviation of either beta: the sensitivity of banks and 
finance companies to economic risk appeared to be essentially the same for the period covered. 
The large alpha factor (a3 of 0.90 percent for finance companies is statistically significant at the 
10 percent level and indicates an extraordinary monthly return on unsystematic risk during the 
23 period.  The alpha for banks was slightly negative and was not statistically significant. 
In all probability, these results are specific to the period studied.  That period is probably 
not representative  of  future conditions for banks and may not be representative  for  finance 
companies.  As Table  1 suggests, it was a period of general retreat for banks from their credit 
policies of the 1980s while commercial finance companies  appeared to have levered their growth 
by exploiting the relatively passive credit posture of banks during the period.  In addition, it was 
a period in which over 600 banks failed. 
Still, the data reveal the viability of nonbank  lenders as risk intervenors in an unregulated 
market.  The finance company example provides insight into the financial parameters, such as 
leverage and loan loss accounting, associated with a free-market competitor and illuminates the 
contrast with the same parameters for a commercial banking system that is subject to extra- 
market discipline.  Despite the interim exit of a significant volume of bank lending, the credit 
markets and the investors in nonbank lenders appear to have been well served. 
contrast  in  Credit  cuklJres 
Commercial  f%nance  companies  traditionally  have  provided  financing  backed  by 
borrowers’ business assets.”  An increasing number of banks also operate asset-based lending 
43 The history of commercial finance companies is one of developing strategies to secure 
borrowers’ assets as the essential basis for funding.  One of their first major business lines 
was the financing of automobile dealer inventories prior to World War I.  Later, financing of 
accounts receivable originated by government contractors gained impetus just before World 
War II when commercial banks, sti.lI  recovering from effects of the banking collapse of the 
early  193Os, proved insufficient for financing the government’s preparations for war.  The 
Contract Assignment Act passed by congress in 1940 brought commercial finance companies 
24 units  within  the chartered  bank,  but they  generally process risk  differently.  The  finance 
companies perceive risk in terms of the collateral supporting their deals while banks are more 
likely to perceive their exposure in terms of the risks their borrowers face. 
In  several  interviews  I  conducted with  commercial  finance company  lenders,  the 
interviewees consistently elaborated on this difference in risk perception.  As a generalization, 
they asserted that bankers engaged in asset-based lending estimate the chances that deals will go 
bad and they attempt to minimize the risk that their borrowers will fail.  On the other hand, the 
interviewees claim that finance company lenders assume deals actually will go bad and they rely 
on their ability to extract themselves by liquidating pledged assets on favorable terms.  This 
difference is critical to the way each type of institution processes risk. 
Rankers are  more subject to the risks of asymmetric information.  Their  efforts  are 
directed to discovering the true values of borrowers’ investment projects by developing reliable 
estimates of borrowers’ future cash flows from operations.”  They set conservative limits on 
the acceptable degree of borrowers’ financial leverage and gain insights into the probabilities 
associated with future cash flows by emphasizing the consistency and length of past profitability. 
to the fore by overturning legal prohibitions against the assignment of claims against 
government orders to finance company lenders by government contract suppliers.  In the late 
195Os, commercial finance companies pioneering the leveraged buyout with “bootstrap 
financing” in which acquisition funding was accomplished with highly conservative use of the 
target companies’ assets as col.lateral. John J. Murphy,  “Asset-Based  Lending: Evolution to 
Revolution Part ii,  1940-196Os,”  77&r  Secured Lender, September/October 1992, 46-51; 
Swift, supra note 39.  Factoring is a much older business that evolved in the nineteenth 
century from agents selling in the United States in the employ of foreign textile mills. 
u  One finance company lender characterized this approach as an exercise in “fictitious 
capital formation”. 
25 On the other hand,  finance company lenders expend large resources on specialists who value and 
continuously  monitor  borrowers’  cash  flows,  receivables,  inventories,  equipment or  other 
collateral and set conservative advance margins against their values.”  This approach typically 
results in larger loans to more highly leveraged borrowers who have less consistent records of 
profitability  and who, frequently, are growing too fast to “clean up” working capital loans.* 
The case of leveraged buyout (LRO) financing provides a straightforward example of this 
contrast  in the risk processing proclivities between commercial bank lenders and commercial 
finance  company  lenders.  Rankers  provide  “structured  financing”,  an  approach  that 
comprehensively reconfigures the target company’s capital structure based on the capacity  of the 
successor entity to produce projected cash flows for servicing debt.  On the other hand, finance 
company lenders structure a loan package that is conservatively supported by a detailed “knock 
down” liquidation appraisal of the target company’s assets.  One interviewee noted, concerning 
the finance company point of view: “Leveraging on the assets of a firm was a natural instinct 
Finance companies’ creative credit techniques involve tremendous detail and close 
controls that “match the likelihood and immediacy of the need to realize on collateral”. 
Patrick Rocker, “The CFA’s Proposal to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,”  Z7ze 
Secured Lend&r, September/October 1993, 76,78.  The objective is to protect and monitor 
the values of assets on which they lend.  Their staffs include disproportionate numbers of 
field auditor/examiners who conduct pre-agreement and on-going full field exams of 
prospects’ inventories and other working capital.  A common technique is to utilize 
lockboxes to capture clients’ flows of cash receipts as a means of controlling loan paydowns 
(receipts are applied to loan outstandings) and to track collection and credit sale activities. 
Some t?rms specializing in sales Finance  make a point of exacting repurchase agreements 
from manufacturers: if the dealer fails, the manufacturer agrees to repossess the dealer’s 
inventory  and to make full restitution to the finance company.  In this case, it is more 
important to monitor the manufacturer’s ability to service potential returned goods than it is 
to monitor the dealer. 
4  A good description of asset-based loan agreements appears in Barry Herskowitz and 
David A. Kaplowitz, “Asset-Based Revolvers,” Joumul  of Accountancy, July  1986, 97-104. 
26 of commercial financiers”. 
supervisory  issues. 
Their contrasting approaches to risk processing adds insight into the different reputations 
for  quality  popularly  associated  with  the  two types  of  firms.  Finance  companies  select 
borrowers  with  exogenous risks  that would typically  disqualify  would-be borrowers  under 
traditional bank selection criteria.  To outsiders, their selection biases make such loans appear 
much riskier than the loans made by banks.  In comparable deals, as noted earlier,  the finance 
companies lend more money 
Enance companies  naturally 
emphasis on niche markets.” 
to less proven and more highly leveraged clients.  In addition, 
develop portfolio  concentrations  because of  their  well-known 
However,  it seems plausible that what appears to be greater lending risks are offset by 
differences in risk intervention.  By lending against the future operating cash flows of single 
borrowers,  banks are exposed to specific risk and asymmetries  in information as well as to 
macro, or systematic, risks.  On the other hand, by lending against asset values and emphasizing 
skills in the marketing of foreclosed assets, finance companies’ exposure occurs in the context 
of relatively efficient markets.  As a result, they tend  to  reduce their exposure to the risks of 
firm-specific events and information asymmetries and limit it to systematic risks and markets 
with more open information flows. 
Bank examiners increasingly are required ;o evaluate  asset-based loans of the type made 
”  Remolona and Wulfekuhler describe finance companies’ “dynamic economies of 
scale” because of specialized information gained through cumulative output in niche markets. 
Supra note 35. 
27 by  finance  companies  because  banking  firms have actively acquired or started up asset-based 
lending units.  These units are the vanguard of the recent and aggressive “down market” shift 
by banking firms into middle market finance.  a  It does not appear that bank supervisors  have 
fully discerned the effectiveness of unbanklike risk control mechanisms used by  asset-based 
lending units within banks and asset-based credit subsidiaries of banks or holding companies. 
Interviews with lenders of both direct credit subsidiaries of banks and indirect credit 
subsidiaries of bank holding companies expressed their apprehension about being examined by 
examiners who were not sufficiently trained and experienced in looking at revolving asset-based 
loans.  They  believed  that  such  examiners  were  predisposed to  isolate  their  attention  on 
borrowers’  financial statements and cash flow prospects (which often appear less strong than 
those  of  typical  bank  borrowers)  and  not on  inventory,  receivables  or  equipment  values, 
collateral control systems and asset disposal skiIls typical of finance companies. 
In a couple of instances,  finance subsidiary lenders reported that they  have initiated 
meetings with examiner  staffs  to  familiarize them with their intensive loan administration, 
preagreement full field examinations of prospective clients’  collateral, manual tracking programs, 
manufacturers’ takeback guarantees and other devices.49 
On the other hand, interviews with senior officers responsible for supervision for federal 
banking agencies revealed that, although they were concerned with the problems of examining 
48 Supra note  14. 
49 The Commercial Finance Company has recently presented a document to the Office of 
th  Comptroller of the Currency designed “to update and modernize the Accounts Receivable 
Financing section of the Comptroller’s Handbook for National Rank Examiners.”  Supru note 
45. 
28 commercial  finance  subsidiaries  but  they  were  confident  that  their  agencies’  examination 
practices  recognized  and adjusted  to the  subs’  nontraditional  risk  control  systems. 
The  decline  in bank  business  lending  and  other  banking  activity  raises  questions  about 
the  protection  of  important  and  unique  banking  functions.  The  questions,  however,  are  not 
couched  in terms  of whether  bank lending  is “good”  in the sense of efficient  allocation  of credit 
in  the  economy.  It  is  desirable  to  try  to  answer  such  a question,  given  the  costs  of  public 
support  of  the banking  system. 
The  surge of finance  company  lending  during  the recent  period  of stagnant  bank  lending 
presents  an opportunity  to test the goodness  of bank  lending  by comparing  the performance  of 
banks  with  an  unregulated  lender.  Based on  rather  incomplete  data,  it appears  from  a  simple 
aggregate  financial  analysis  that finance  companies  were no riskier,  and possibly  were  less  so, 
than  commercial  banks.  However,  they appear  to have produced  greater  accounting  returns  as 
well  as  significantly  greater  risk-adjusted  market  returns  for  their  shareholders  despite  their 
substantially  greater  capital  positions. 
As banks  reassert  themselves  in credit  markets  for business,  the finance companies  make 
attractive  acquisition  targets.  The public  support  base for banks implied  in the deposit  insurance 
system  should  enable  banks to continue  to acquire  and financially  lever  finance  company  assets. 
29 The evidence  presented  raises  questions  about possible  losses  in credit  allocation  efficiency  over 
the lending  cycle  from such developments. 
30 Table  1 
Business Credit  Outstanding 
Insured  U.  S.  Commercial  Banks  (CB) 
Finance  Companies  (FC) 
Year 
Business  Credit  Proportion.  Growth Rate 
$ billion  percent  percent 
CB  FC  FUCB  CB  FC 
1980  391  90  23 
1981  455  100  22 
1982  504  101  20 
1983  525  113  22 
1984  565  135  24 
1985  578  158  27 
1936  601  173  29 
1987  590  207  35 
1988  600  236  39 
1989  619  256  41 
1990  615  294  48 
1991  559  293  52 
1992  536  297  55 
199311  536  291  54 
16  11 
11  1 
4  12 
8  19 
2  17 
4  10 
-2  20 
2  14 
3  8 
-1  15 
-9  0 
-4  1 
0  -2 
31 Table  2 
Loan  Charge-off,  Loss  Allowance 
and  Noncurrent  Asset Ratios 
FDIC-Insured  Commercial  Banks  (CB) 






CB  FC 
Allowances  Allowances 
for  losses/  for  losses/ 
next period  noncurrent 
net charge-offs  loans 
ratio  ratio 


































(3)  (4) 
2.79  - 
1.80  - 
1.69  - 
1.54  - 
1.47  - 
1.45  - 
1.79  1.41 
2.74  1.93 
2.09  1.69 
1.82  1.43 
1.06  1.29 
2.13  1.71 
3.25  - 
(5)  (6) 
0.70 
0.37  0.55 
0.38  0.58 
0.43  0.55 
0.53  0.57 
0.60  0.62 
0.78  0.76 
0.82  0.81 
0.86  0.77 
0.71  0.69 
0.72  0.52 
0.87  - 
1993  0.84  -  1.07  - 
6-yr  record 
mean  1.25  1.38  2.04  1.58 
std dev  0.26  0.19  0.39  0.24 
Total  record 
mean 
std dev  -  - 
0.68  0.65 
0.22  0.10 
Source:  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  Division  of Research  and  Statistics;  various 
publications  on  face  company  ratios,  First  National  Bank of Chicago.  Bank  statistics  for  1993 is 
based  on  annualized  data  for  first  three  quarters.  Bank  noncurrent  asset  ratio  is loans  and  leases  90 or 
more  days  past-due  and  in nonaccrual  status  divided  by  total  loans  and  leases;  finance  company 
noncurrent  asset  ratio  is commercial  loan  balances  delinquent  60 days  or  more  divided  by  commercial 
loan  receivables. 
32 Table 3 
Capital  Ratios and Return  on Equity 
FDIC-Insured  Commercial  Banks  (CB) 




percent  difference 
Return  on 
Eauitv 
percent 





































































1c  71  1993  9.0  -  12. /I 
Total record: 
mean  10.34  12.96 















Source:  See notes,  Table 2. 
33 Table  4 
Stock  Index  Returns 
and  Risk 
( monthly  percentage returns  and 
standard  deviations: dividends excluded) 
January  1989 - October  1993 
Returns  Std.  Dev  a,  R2 
SNL  Bank  Stocks  0.71  5.86  -0.182  1.231’  .59 
(0.496)  (0.134) 
SNL  Finance  Company 
Stocks 
1.81  6.15  0.903”  1.260’  .56 
(0.539)  (0.141) 
S&P  500  Stocks  0.82  3.71 
9 1  -day  treasury  bills  0.46  0.18 
*  significant  at  1 percent  level. 
**  significant  at  10 percent  level. 
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